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TULIPS, ORANGES, WORMS, AND COINS – VIRTUAL, DIGITAL, OR
CRYPTO CURRENCY AND THE SECURITIES LAWS
Thomas Lee Hazen*
This Article examines the applicability of the federal securities laws
to digital currencies. Although some enforcement actions have been
brought by the SEC, digital currency transactions remain largely
unregulated. The securities laws contain a broad definition of what
constitutes a security. Finding a security to exist triggers many
regulatory provisions of the securities laws. There is considerable
case law interpreting the now well-developed test for what
constitutes an “investment contract” leading to the finding that a
security exists. However, to date, there is sparse authority applying
the securities laws to virtual, digital, or crypto currencies. This
article examines the investment contract analysis and concludes that
initial coin offerings and many, if not most, digital currency
transactions involve securities and therefore are subject to SEC
jurisdiction and to the jurisdiction of state securities administrators.
The article then outlines the regulatory consequences of applying
the securities laws to digital currency transactions.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Over the years, a wide variety of nontraditional investments
from orange groves to earthworms and scotch whiskey have been
held to be securities.1 But what about virtual, digital, or crypto
currency (hereinafter collectively referred to as crypto currency)?
During the seventeenth century, speculation resulted in the
infamous tulip bubble.2 The lessons for virtual, digital, or crypto
currencies should not be ignored. The tulip bubble has been
summarized as follows:
One of the largest speculative bubbles began in 1593 when tulips were
brought to Holland, and over time, the tulips began to contract viruses
that made flame-like colors appear on the bulbs. Tulips with flame-like
color patterns were trading at much higher values than the unaffected
bulbs, and by the 1630s, everyone in Holland began trading the bulbs;
tulip-mania was born. Actual price data from the 1630s is scarce, but the
Rijksmuseum (the Museum of the Netherlands) claims that traders were
putting up their houses as collateral to secure tulip bulbs. The price of
the tulips during this period was not an accurate representation of what

1

See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (holding that an
orange grove can be considered a security); SEC v. Haffenden–Rimar Int’l., Inc.,
362 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff’d, 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding
that scotch whiskey can be considered a security); In re Worm World, Inc., 3 Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 71,414 (S.D. Dep’t. of Comm. & Consumer Aff. 1978)
(holding that earthworms can be considered securities). For a more complete
taxonomy of investments that have been held to be securities, see 1 THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:49 (7th ed. 2016).
2
See, e.g., CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR
DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS (1841) (discussing the tulip bubble).
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the bulbs were actually worth, and once some investors decided to sell,
the price of bulbs began to fall. When this happened, other investors sold
their tulips to avoid even bigger losses, and the bubble burst.3

As compared to crypto currencies, tulips at least have some intrinsic
value.4 In light of the massive investor losses that have occurred and
are likely to continue to result from virtual or crypto currencies,
appropriate regulation is necessary.5
The securities laws’ definition is expansive because of its
inclusion of “investment contract” in the statutory definition6 and
the courts’ interpretation of that phrase.7 This article concludes that
3

Nathan J. Sherman, Note, A Behavioral Economics Approach to Initial Coin
Offerings, 107 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 17, 21 (2018) (footnotes omitted) (first citing
Andrew Beattie, Market Crashes: The Tulip and Bulb Craze
(1630s), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/features/crashes/crashes
2.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2019); then citing Elvis Picardo, Five of the Largest
Asset Bubbles in History, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
articles/personal-finance/062315/five-largest-asset-bubbles-history.asp
(last
updated June 23, 2015)); see also Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An
Experimental-Asset-Market Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation,
2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 990 (2007) (describing tulip mania).
4
Alex Hern, Bitcoin hype worse than ‘tulip mania’, says Dutch central banker,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/0
4/bitcoin-bubble-tulip-dutch-banker (quoting former Dutch Central Bank
president: “‘This is worse than the tulip mania,’ he continued. ‘At least then you
got a tulip [at the end], now you get nothing.’” (alteration in original)).
5
See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 3, at 35 (arguing that “regulators must regulate
ICOs [initial coin offerings] using an asymmetrically paternalistic framework”);
see also, e.g., Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial
Products, Intermediation and Markets – Policy Implications for Financial
Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 55 (2016) (discussing policy implications);
John T. Holden, Trifling and Gambling with Virtual Money, 25 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 41 (2018) (discussing regulatory potential and impact on gambling); Misha
Tsukerman, The Block is Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin Regulation and
Suggestions for the Future, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127 (2015) (discussing
various regulatory approaches); Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes,
Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future
Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813 (2014) (same).
6
E.g., Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)
(2018).
7
See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); see also, e.g., Laura
Gritz, Teaching a New Dog Old Tricks: Why the Howey Test is Still the SEC’s
Best Friend When Examining Initial Coin Offerings, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.
193
(2018),
http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Gritz_Final.pdf
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under most, if not all, circumstances, crypto currencies are likely to
be securities. This article also explains the consequences under the
securities laws of classifying a crypto currency as a security.
II. BACKGROUND – THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRYPTO
CURRENCIES
Crypto currencies are essentially computer code that enables
their use as digital currencies. Bitcoin became the first widely used
decentralized digital currency.8 Other virtual currencies followed.
Bitcoin’s purpose was to create a peer-to-peer version of electronic
cash to allow for secure online payments without the need for thirdparty intermediaries such as banks.9 In order to avoid doublespending of the same crypto token, public ledgers provide a basis
for authenticating the currency10 and to confirm that the funds being
transferred existed in the amount and manner specified.11
Crypto currencies consist of blockchains. A blockchain is a
distributed record made of up of processed batches of transactions,
and each processed batch is referred to as a block. The blocks are
sequenced, and each block has data associated with it that is the
result of all the blocks before it. Therefore, the blocks are in this way
related, or chained, in a manner such that any one change to the
history would be highly evident, because the subsequent blocks will

(discussing the Howey test and digital currency); Joseph D. Moran, The Impact of
Regulatory Measures Imposed on Initial Coin Offerings in the United States
Market Economy, 26 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 7 (2018) (discussing the impact of
the securities laws on virtual currencies); Nicholas Wenker, Online Currencies,
Real-World Chaos: The Struggle to Regulate the Rise of Bitcoin, 19 TEX. REV. L.
& POL’Y 145 (2014) (discussing bitcoin and regulation).
8
See SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH
SYSTEM, http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (describing the rise of bitcoin).
9
See id. at 1.
10
See generally Kelsey Bolin, Decentralized Public Ledger Systems and
Securities Law: New Applications of Blockchain Technology and the
Revitalization of Sections 11 and 12(A)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 95 WASH.
U. L. REV. 955, 957 (2018).
11
See Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain
Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569, 577–78 (2015).
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change as a result.12 A new transaction is added to the existing
blockchain when a computer on the crypto currency’s network
verifies that the transaction is legitimate. All of the computers on the
crypto currency’s network have access to the blockchain, back to the
first transaction, and it is continually updated by passing the new
blocks to other users in the network. A crypto coin file is given a
unique serial number when a transfer is requested. The new serial
number is broadcasted to all other computers in the crypto coin
network who then work to decode the new serial number which
verifies that the crypto coin’s transferor in fact owns the coin being
transferred and has not already transferred that coin to someone else.
A verified transaction becomes the latest block in the blockchain.
The transactions are secured through public-key encryption.
Essentially, two mathematically-related keys are generated: the
private key is for the individual and the other key is made public to
help encode payments. The private key is used to retrieve those
payments and to approve transfers.
Blockchain technology removes the need for the third-party
because the technology itself verifies the transactions by allowing
for secure electronic transactions without having a centralized
ledger or the concern of double-spending.13 The blockchain works
through the parties of the transaction broadcasting that transaction
to the network and then requiring the network to validate the
transaction through a “proof-of-work” validation system.14 The
proof-of-work validation system is a competition between crypto
coin network participants to validate the transactions and is
otherwise known as “mining.”15 Mining verifies the transaction and
12

For a general discussion of the technology, see Deborah Ginsberg, The
Building Blocks of Blockchain, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming May
2019). See also, e.g., Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for
Blockchain, UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3324660.
13
See NAKAMOTO, supra note 8, at 8; see also, e.g., How Bitcoin Works,
BITCOIN, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/How_bitcoin_works (last visited June 4, 2018);
J.P., Virtual Currency: Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST (June 13, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency.
14
See Kiviat, supra note 11, at 578.
15
Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency,
and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 119 (2012);
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removes the need for the third-party intermediary. Verifying a
crypto transaction involves a race between computers in the network
to solve a very difficult algorithm problem with the winner receiving
the crypto currency as compensation. Solving the problem verifies
that a transaction is valid, and the winner records the transaction
onto the blockchain.16 Mining is important because it is how the
network deems a new block or transaction valid.17
Traditionally, a true currency is backed by a sovereign state, 18
and thus crypto currencies do not qualify under the traditional
definition. Nevertheless, crypto currencies have been described as
alternatives to true currency.19 So long as they remain volatile with
wild price swings this is unlikely to happen. However, when a nation
has an unusually volatile currency, crypto currencies may have some
traction as a currency substitute.20
see, e.g., Darren J. Sandler, Citrus Groves in the Cloud: Is Cryptocurrency Cloud
Mining a Security?, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. J. 250 (2018).
16
Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund:
Operational Issues and Best Practices for an Emergent Investment Industry, 23
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 112, 120–21 (2018) (describing crypto currency
mechanics).
17
J.P., supra note 13 (describing crypto currency). Additionally, mining helps
the network police itself. In order for a fraudster to doctor and validate blocks they
would have to control more than half of the network’s mining capacity. Finally,
mining increases the number of crypto coins within the total supply. Blocks in the
network are created at a constant rate with a set number of crypto coins created
per block which increases the number of crypto coins in circulation.
18
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(m) (2016) (FinCen’s definition); see also,
e.g.,
What
is
Fiat
Money?,
CORP.
FIN.
INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/fiatmoney-currency/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2019) (discussing the difference between
commodity backed currency and fiat currencies backed by government).
19
See, e.g., Susan Alkadri, Note, Defining and Regulating Cryptocurrency:
Fake Internet Money or Legitimate Medium of Exchange, 17 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 71 (2018) (arguing that crypto currency should be treated as money or
currency for regulatory purposes); Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp (last updated Feb. 12,
2019) (describing crypto currency).
20
See, e.g., A.F., Why Are Venezuelans Mining So Much Bitcoin?, ECONOMIST
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/04/03/
why-are-venezuelans-mining-so-much-bitcoin (discussing currency volatility);
Billy Bambrough, Bitcoin Believers Speak Out in Venezuela as Maduro Makes
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The SEC is not the only federal regulator who has a role to play
with respect to crypto currencies.21 There are a number of other
potential regulators for the crypto currency markets.22 For example,
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulates
virtual currency transactions as commodities.23 The United States
Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”) also comes into play as may the banking regulators. 24
In addition, the states have entered the crypto currency regulatory
arena.25
Historical Devaluation, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/billybambrough/2018/08/20/bitcoin-believers-speak-out-in-venezuela-asmaduro-makes-historical-devaluation/#b7a474445ae5 (same); Iyke Aru, Bitcoin:
An Alternative Solution to Venezuela’s Economic Crisis, CCN (June 29, 2018),
https://www.ccn.com/bitcoin-an-alternative-solution-to-venezuelas-economiccrisis/ (same).
21
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK,
FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS
ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013)
[hereinafter
FIN-2013-G001],
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutesregulations/guidance/application-fincens-regulations-persons-administering.
22
See, e.g., Scott D. Hughes, Cryptocurrency Regulations and Enforcement in
the U.S., 45 W. ST. L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing regulatory alternatives); see also,
e.g., Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated
Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041 (2017) (discussing
potential regulation).
23
See In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29, at 3 (Sept. 17, 2015),
http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalp
leading/enfcoinfliprorder09172015.pdf (“Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are
encompassed in the definition and properly defined as commodities.”). See
generally David E. Aron & Matthew Jones, The CFTC’s Characterization of
Virtual Currencies as Commodities: Implications Under the Commodity
Exchange Act and CFTC Regulations, 38 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1,
May 2018, No. 5, at 1 (discussing virtual currencies and CFTC jurisdiction);
NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, INTERPRETIVE NOTICE 9073, DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS FOR NFA MEMBERS ENGAGING IN VIRTUAL CURRENCY
ACTIVITIES
(2018),
https://www.nfa.futures.org/rulebook/rules.aspx?Section=9&RuleID=9073
(providing that disclosure requirements are applicable to commodities
professionals with respect to digital currency transactions).
24
See, e.g., FIN-2013-G001, supra note 21.
25
See, e.g., Benjamin Bain, Wyoming Aims to be America’s Cryptocurrency
Capital,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(May
15,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-15/wyoming-aims-to-be-
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It can of course be argued that since it is a medium of payment
which can be used in commerce, investment in a crypto currency is
based on its use as a currency rather than as an investment for profit.
However, there are multiple examples of crypto currencies not being
classified as currency. For example, FinCEN determined that crypto
currency is not a currency since it is not “legal tender.”26 The IRS
has concurred,27 as has the CFTC.28 At least one court has expressly
indicated that notwithstanding Bitcoin’s use as a currency, it was a
security.29 As discussed more fully in the sections that follow, the
SEC has initiated action against other crypto currencies by
characterizing them as securities.30
america-s-cryptocurrency-capital (describing Wyoming crypto currency
legislation).
26
See FIN-2013-G001, supra note 21.
27
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, at 1–2 (Apr. 14, 2014) (explaining that virtual
currencies are to be treated as property for tax purposes); see also, e.g., I.R.S.
News Release IR-2018-71 (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irsreminds-taxpayers-to-report-virtual-currency-transactions.
28
See CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp.3d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that
virtual currencies are commodities subject to CFTC jurisdiction and regulatory
requirements); see also, e.g., CFTC No. 18-14, Advisory with Respect to Virtual
Currency Derivative Product Listings, 2018 WL 2387847 (May 21, 2018); see
generally Aron & Jones, supra note 23, at 24 n.75–76; Mitchell Prentis, Digital
Metal: Regulating Bitcoin as a Commodity, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 609, 624–
25 (2015) (discussing regulating bitcoin under commodities laws). There is at
least one example of the CFTC and SEC bringing separate enforcement actions
against the same virtual currency operation. See CFTC v. 1pool Ltd., No. 1:18CV-2243, (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/201809/enf1poolpatrickajeltakecomplaint092718.pdf; SEC v. 1pool Ltd, No. 1:18CV-02244 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
complaints/2018/comp-pr2018-218.pdf.
29
SEC v. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 2013). But cf. Edvard
Pettersson, SEC Handed Setback on Whether Digital Tokens are Securities,
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/X58TGJ38000000?udv_expired=true (showing that federal court
denied preliminary injunction against digital coin offering to 32 “test investors”).
30
See generally Cyber Enforcement Actions: Digital Assets/Initial Coin
Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersec
urity-enforcement-actions (last updated Apr. 5, 2019) (listing, among other
actions, cryptocurrency-related enforcement actions); Aron & Jones, supra note
23; see also, e.g., SEC Div. Corp. Fin. Public Statement, Statement on Digital
Asset Securities Issuance and Trading (Nov. 16, 2018) [hereinafter SEC Public
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III. DEFINITION OF “SECURITY;” THE HOWEY TEST AND THE
RISK CAPITAL ANALYSIS
A. The Statutory Definition
The federal securities laws provide a fairly lengthy definition of
“security.”31 The statutory definition includes specific items such as
stock and also includes the broad term “investment contract.”32 The
definition of securities under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933
Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) are
“virtually identical.”33 State securities laws contain a similar
definition and by and large have adopted the federal courts’
interpretations of what constitutes a security.34 Section 2(a)(1) of the
1933 Act provides:
(a) When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires—
(1) The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security
future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for,

Statement], https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/digital-asset-securitesissuuance-and-trading.
31
1933 Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018); 1934 Act § 3(a)(10),
§ 78c(a)(10) (2018). The few differences between the two definitions have no
impact on the determination of whether crypto currency is a security.
32
1933 Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018); 1934 Act § 3(a)(10),
§ 78c(a)(10) (2018).
33
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
34
See the Uniform Securities Act § 102(28), which has been adopted by many
states and parallels the federal statutory definition. See generally Douglas M.
Branson & Karl Shumpei Okamoto, The Supreme Court’s Literalism and the
Definition of “Security” in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (1993)
(discussing state law and the definition of security).
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guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.35

Although the statutory definition includes the term “investment
contract,” Congress chose not to define that term and therefore left
its interpretation to the courts. The “investment contract” rubric thus
provides the context for determining whether unconventional
investments fall within the securities laws’ definition of security. As
mentioned above, a number of nontraditional investments have been
held to be securities. The existence of an investment contract
depends not so much on what is actually being offered or sold, but
as on how it is being offered and sold and the expectations of
investors based on marketing, promotion, and the realities of the
markets where the investment transaction takes place.36
In analyzing whether something is a security, the focus is on
substance rather than form. Thus, whether or not a particular
investment vehicle falls within the definition of security depends on
the economic reality of the transaction.37 As a result, the fact that
crypto currency is described as a coin or currency is beside the point.
35
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). Although not the primary
focus of this article, it is worth noting that crypto currencies clearly fall within the
definition of commodity under the Commodity Exchange Act, which provides:
(9) Commodity
The term “commodity” means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye,
flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum
(Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow,
cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and oils),
cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal,
livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and
all other goods and articles, except onions (as provided by section 13-1
of this title) and motion picture box office receipts (or any index,
measure, value, or data related to such receipts), and all services, rights,
and interests (except motion picture box office receipts, or any index,
measure, value or data related to such receipts) in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.
7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2018) (emphasis added).
36
See generally Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks of
Investments in Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities
Regulation, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 69 (2018) (discussing different crypto currencies
and the securities laws).
37
See, e.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975)
(“Congress intended the application of these statutes to turn on
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B. The Howey Test
The 1946 decision of the United States Supreme Court in SEC
v. W. J. Howey & Co.,38 established the test for determining when an
investment contract exists so as to classify an investment as a
security. Although the Howey test has been refined in the more than
seventy years since it was first announced, it remains the guiding
principle. The Court’s opinion set forth that “[a]n investment
contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money [2] in
a common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits [4] solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”39 The investment of
“money” includes the investment of anything of value such as
property or services.40 It seems clear that crypto currency involves
an upfront investment of money or something of value.
The common enterprise requirement focuses on the question of
the extent to which the success of the investor’s interest rises and
falls with others involved in the enterprise.41 Crypto currency has no
inherent value beyond what others are willing to pay for it or value
it as. Thus, the common enterprise element seems to be satisfied. As
the economic realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto.”); Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336 (“[I]n searching for the meaning and scope
of the word ‘security’ in the Act(s), form should be disregarded for substance and
the emphasis should be on economic reality.”); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298 (1946) (holding that the profitability of the orange groves was in
economic reality dependent upon using the promoter’s management contract).
38
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 293.
39
Id. at 298–99.
40
See, e.g., Popovice v. Milides, 11 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(“[S]everal courts have held that an agreement exchanging services for stock
constitutes a ‘sale’ under the Securities Exchange Act.”); SEC v. Int’l Heritage,
Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382–83 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (holding that labor can satisfy
the investment requirement); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709, 722 (N.D. Tex.
1961) (holding that investment of services can trigger securities laws).
41
See, e.g., SEC v. Eurobond Exchange, Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir.
1994) (“A common enterprise is a venture ‘in which the “fortunes of the investor
are interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking
the investment . . . .”’”) (quoting SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co. of Nevada,
758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985)); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th
Cir. 1978); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
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discussed below, the main points of controversy as to whether
crypto currencies are securities revolves around the profit
expectation and whether that profit is to be derived from the efforts
of others.42 A substantial profit motive is sufficient to support this
aspect of the Howey test, even if it is not the only factor motivating
investors.43 Although the Supreme Court in Howey spoke in terms
of the requirement that the profits be secured “solely” from the
efforts of others,44 the interpretation in subsequent federal cases only
requires that the profits be expected to be derived primarily or
“substantially” from the efforts of others.45
In addition to the Howey factors, courts have looked to the
presence or absence of another applicable regulatory regime in order
to determine whether an investment contract and, thus a security,
exists.46 In a close case, the presence of a regulatory scheme
covering the investment in question mitigates against classifying the
investment as a security.47 Conversely, the absence of a parallel
regulatory scheme to reduce risk will mitigate in favor of finding a
security.48 Although there is some regulation of crypto currency
exchanges that register as money transmitters,49 that regulation does
42
See, e.g., Ruoke Yang, When Is Bitcoin A Security Under U.S. Securities
Law?, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 99, 111 (2013) (discussing the Howey test’s profit
requirement as it relates to bitcoin).
43
See 1 HAZEN, supra note 1, § 1:54 (discussing the profit requirement of the
Howey test).
44
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298–99.
45
See, e.g., Webster v. Omnitrition Int’l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1996);
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974); Glenn W.
Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d at 482.
46
See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (stating one of the
factors as “whether some factor such as the existence of another regulatory
scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby rendering
application of the Securities Acts unnecessary”); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 557 (1982) (noting existence of bank regulation as a factor in holding
that a bank issued certificate of deposit is not a security).
47
See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 67; Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557.
48
Reves, 494 U.S. at 58 (noting short term note was a security notwithstanding
the exclusion in the 1934 Act for short term commercial paper).
49
See, e.g., FIN-2013-G001, supra note 21; see also DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN.
CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2014-R007, APPLICATION OF MONEY SERVICES
BUSINESS REGULATIONS TO THE RENTAL OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS FOR MINING
VIRTUAL CURRENCY (2014), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/administ
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not involve investor protection. This absence of other investor
protection regulation weighs in favor of classifying crypto
currencies as securities. It is worth noting, however, that Heather
Peirce, one of the current SEC Commissioners, believes that the
Howey test may need to be modified in its application to crypto
currency but she seems to concede that Congressional action would
be necessary to do so.50
C. The Risk Capital Analysis
An alternative to the Howey test developed under state securities
laws containing the investment contract language has been
favorably acknowledged in some federal decisions.51 This risk
capital analysis is not as limiting as the Howey test since it is not
bound to the four Howey factors discussed in the previous section.
As explained by a California case that found country club founder
interests to be securities:
It bears noting that the act extends even to transactions where capital is
placed without expectation of any material benefits . . . . Since the act
does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what is a
security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in
legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in
one form or another . . . . Properly so, for otherwise it could too easily be
vitiated by inventive substitutes for conventional means of raising risk
capital.52

rative_ruling/FIN-2014-R007.pdf (discussing FinCen and virtual currencies);
James Gatto & Elsa S. Broeker, Bitcoin & Beyond: Current and Future
Regulation of Virtual Currencies, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429
(2015) (same); Jacob Hamburger, Comment, Bitcoins v. State Money
Transmission Laws: Protecting Consumers or Hindering Innovation?, 11 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 229 (2015) (same).
50
See Andrew Ramonas, Securities Test May Not Help Classify Crypto, SEC’s
Pierce
Says
(1),
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Feb.
8,
2019),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/securities-test-may-not-helpclassify-crypto-secs-peirce-says-1.
51
See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961);
State by Comm’r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw.
1971).
52
Silver Hills Country Club, 5361 P.2d at 908–09. In Tanenbaum v. Agri–
Capital, Inc., 885 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1989), the court conducted a risk capital
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The risk capital approach can be defined in terms of four factors. 53
The risk capital analysis will result in the finding of an investment
contract when (1) the investor provides initial value to the
enterprise; (2) the initial value is subject to the risks of the
enterprise; (3) the initial value is induced by representations leading
to a reasonable understanding that the investor will realize a
valuable benefit beyond the initial value; and (4) the investor does
not exercise practical and managerial control over the enterprise.54 It
is possible for this risk capital analysis to classify investments as
securities that might not satisfy each prong of the Howey test.55
As noted above, the risk capital analysis is established under the
law of many states56 and there is some discussion and support in the
federal courts as well. For example, one federal court commented
that it is unsettled whether the risk capital test applies to “only
original ‘start-up’ capitalization or whether it also extends to
transactions connected with subsequent capitalization.”57 Even with

analysis when applying state law and examining whether cattle embryo contract
was the sale of a security was a question of fact. See generally id.
53
See Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d at 109.
54
Id. (“An investment contract is created whenever: (1) an offeree furnishes
initial value to an offeror, and (2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the
risks of the enterprise, and (3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the
offeror’s promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind over and above the initial value
will accrue to the offeree as a result, of the operation of the enterprise, and (4) the
offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the
managerial decisions of the enterprise.”); Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic
Realities of a “Security”: Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L.
REV. 367 (1967).
55
See, e.g., Kevin W. Humphries, Not Your Older Brother’s Bonds: The Use
and Regulation of Social-Impact Bonds in the United States, 76 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 443, 445 (2013) (“The risk-capital test is generally more inclusive than
the Howey test.”).
56
See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club, 361 P.2d at 908; Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc.,
485 P.2d at 109.
57
Sec. Adm’r v. Coll. Assistance Plan (Guam) Inc., 533 F. Supp. 118, 123 (D.
Guam 1981), aff’d, 700 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983) (commenting on Jet Set Travel
Club v. Corp. Comm’r, 535 P.2d 109 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975), which held that where
memberships in travel club had materialized, the memberships were not
investment contracts).
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such a limitation on the risk capital test, it would clearly include an
ICO since an ICO functions as a start-up investment.
Other federal cases have discussed the risk capital analysis with
apparent approval.58 However, it is at least questionable whether the
risk capital analysis has had success under federal law where the
Howey test would fail to find a security.59 Nevertheless, the more
expansive risk capital analysis can trigger state securities law
consequences for transactions not satisfying the four-pronged
Howey test. In the event that the federal courts and SEC do not
embrace the broader risk capital analysis, it remains viable for state
securities administrators pursuing crypto currency transactions.
Thus, it is conceivable that states will assert jurisdiction over crypto
currencies as securities in instances where the SEC does not.

58

See, e.g., Simon Oil Co. v. Norman, 789 F.2d 780, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1986)
(relying on cases using the risk capital analysis to find oil and gas drilling interests
were securities); Union Planters Nat’l Bank v. Commercial Credit Bus. Loans,
651 F.2d 1174, 1181–82 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying risk capital analysis but finding
that a loan participation agreement with a bank was not a security); Parvin v.
Davis Oil Co., 524 F.2d 112, 114–16 (9th Cir. 1975) (using risk capital analysis
to find undivided interests in oil and gas drilling were securities); SEC v. Koscot,
Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 477 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussing risk capital
analysis favorably); Bitter v. Hoby’s Int’l., Inc., 498 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1974)
(applying risk capital analysis but finding franchise arrangement was not a
security); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D.
Tenn. 1987) (applying risk capital analysis but finding mortgage loans and
guarantees not to be securities); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., 577 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Mass. 1983) (applying risk capital analysis but
finding that federally insured certificates of deposits were not securities); SEC v.
Glen W. Turner Enters, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766, 773–74 (D. Or. 1972), aff’d, 474
F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973) (“The spread of the risk capital theory from the state in
which it was first applied to other states and the favorable comment with which it
has been received make it an appropriate test to look to for determining what is
‘commonly known as a security.’”).
59
See, e.g., Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (quoting
Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 646 (D. Colo. 1970),
aff’d, 460 F.2d 666, 670–71 (10th Cir. 1972)) (noting that adoption of a risk
capital test “would work an unwarranted extension of the Securities Act”).
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IV. CRYPTO CURRENCY AS A SECURITY
Although some have argued that crypto currencies are not
securities,60 the better view is that crypto currency transactions often,
if not generally, are subject to the securities laws.61 In 2017, the SEC
issued a report concluding that in many circumstances, offers and
sales of crypto currencies will be securities transactions and thus
subject to the SEC regulatory regime.62 The court cases on point
agree that crypto currencies can be characterized as securities. In
SEC v. Shavers,63 the district court held that Bitcoin was a security
even though the court acknowledged that it could be used as a
currency as well.64 In United States v. Zaslavskiy,65 the district court
upheld the sufficiency of an indictment charging securities fraud in
connection with an ICO (Initial Coin Offering).66 The court in
Zaslavskiy found the allegations were sufficient to uphold the claim
that the crypto currency in question was a security under the test
established by SEC v. Howey and its progeny.67 The court in
Zaslavskiy noted, however, that ultimately the question of whether
the crypto currency is a security would be a question for the jury.68
60
See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Alberts & Bertrand Fry, Is Bitcoin a Security?, 21 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 21 (2015); Kaplanov, supra note 15, at 160–61.
61
See, e.g., Yang, supra note 42, at 111 (discussing applicability of the
securities laws); see also, e.g., Ethan D. Trotz, Tangled Up in Blue: Adapting
Securities Laws to Initial Coin Offerings, 10 ELON L. REV. (Jan. 2019).
62
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 34-81207, 2017 WL 7184670
(July 25, 2017) [hereinafter DAO Report].
63
SEC v. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. 2013).
64
Id. at *2 (“It can be used to purchase goods or services, and as Shavers stated,
used to pay for individual living expenses. The only limitation of Bitcoin is that
it is limited to those places that accept it as currency. However, it can also be
exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, Euro, Yen, and
Yuan. Therefore, Bitcoin is a currency or form of money . . . .”).
65
United States v. Zaslavskiy, 2018 WL 4346336 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
66
Id. at *1. The indictment was based on alleged violations of the SEC’s general
antifraud proscription found in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
67
Zaslavskiy, 2018 WL 4346336, at *9.
68
Id. But cf. Pettersson, supra note 29 (federal court denied preliminary
injunction against digital coin offering to 32 “test investors”).
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As noted above, it has been argued by some that crypto
currencies are not securities because of the requirement of a profit
expectation and that the profit is to be derived from the efforts of
others.69 It has been argued that because it is a currency which can
be used in commerce, investment in a crypto currency is based on
its use as a currency rather than as an investment for profit. 70
However, the wild fluctuations in value and investor expectations
undermine the claim that it is a currency rather than a security.
Furthermore, there is evidence that a majority of transactions in
crypto currencies are for investment or speculation rather than for
barter.71 Also, as observed earlier, crypto currencies have no
inherent value.72 Additionally, the value of a derivative currency is
not derivative of a commodity, security, or anything else that has
inherent value. Accordingly, the value of, and potential profit from,
the currency is dependent upon others promoting and facilitating a
market for the currency. This satisfies the Howey requirement that
the profit be derived from the efforts of others.
An ICO is the crypto currency’s counterpart to an initial public
offering (“IPO”) of securities.73 There is no doubt that ICOs have
69

See, e.g., Yang, supra note 42, at 111.
See, e.g., Alberts & Fry, supra note 60.
71
See, e.g., Camila Russo, Bitcoin Speculators, Not Drug Dealers, Dominate
Crypto
Use
Now,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
7,
2018,
7:15
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-07/bitcoinspeculators-not-drug-dealers-dominate-crypto-use-now.
72
See supra text accompanying note 4.
73
See, e.g., Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David
Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3215345 (describing ICOs);
Alexis Collomb, Primavera De Filippi & Klara Sok, From IPOs to ICOs: The
Impact of Blockchain Technology on Financial Regulation (June 11, 2018)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3185347 (comparing IPOs
and ICOs); Marco Dell’Erba, Initial Coin Offerings: The Response of Regulatory
Authorities, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1107 (2018) (discussing regulatory
responses); see also, e.g., Hayden M. Baker, Tales from the Crypt: The Securities
Law Implications of Initial Coin Offerings and a Framework for a Compliant
ICO, 46 SEC. REG. L.J. 309 (2018) (discussing ICOs); Matthew J. Higgins, Recent
Development, Munchee Inc.: A Turning Point for the Cryptocurrency Industry,
97 N.C. L. REV. 220 (2018) (same); John D. Shire & James R. Billings-Kang, A
Security is a Security: How Initial Coin Offerings May Trigger Securities
Enforcement and Penalties, 23 WALL. ST. L. 1 (2019) (same); Julianna Debler,
70

510

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 493

raised a number of problems. For example, according to one study,
half of ICOs are followed by the demise of the currency within a
four-month period.74 The enhanced hazards of ICOs as compared to
after-market crypto transactions are not by themselves a reason to
reach different conclusions as to the applicability of the securities
laws. Nevertheless, an SEC official indicated his belief that although
ICOs are likely to involve securities, once the ICO is complete, the
currency may cease to be a security.75 However, if a particular type
of investment is a security when it is created, there is no precedent
for treating it differently in the after-market.
Crypto currencies’ volatility and high risk is beyond question.
As noted earlier, the absence of a parallel regulatory scheme to
reduce risk is a significant factor in deciding to classify something
as a security.76 Given the high risk of purchasing virtual currency
through an ICO or in secondary after-market transactions,77 the
absence of another regulatory scheme argues strongly in favor of
classifying virtual and crypto currencies as securities. The SEC has

Note, Foreign Initial Coin Offering Issuers Beware: The Securities and Exchange
Commission is Watching, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 245 (2018) (same); Trotz, supra
note 61 (same).
74
Hugo Benedetti & Leonard Kostovetsky, Digital Tulips? Returns to Investors
in Initial Coin Offerings (June 5, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3182169 (describing ICO failures); see Olga Kharif, Half
of ICOs Die Within Four Months After Token Sales Finalized, BLOOMBERG (July
9,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-07-09/half-of-icosdie-within-four-months-after-token-sales-finalized (same).
75
William Hinman, Director, Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic) (June 14, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418; see also, e.g.,
Benjamin Bain & Lily Katz, Crypto Coins Surge as SEC Spares Ether from
Securities Rules, BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/ne
ws/articles/2018-06-14/ether-surges-after-top-sec-official-says-it-s-not-asecurity.
76
See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 58 (1990).
77
See, e.g., DEAD COINS, https://deadcoins.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2019)
(listing filed crypto currencies).
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issued a number of investor alerts cautioning about virtual and
crypto currencies and their investment risks.78
Consider the analogy to an old-fashioned chain letter or to a
Ponzi scheme.79 In both instances, something without any inherent
value has value pumped into it so long as the participants are willing
to contribute and pay the cost of keeping the scheme afloat. The
78

Spotlight on Initial Coin Offerings and Digital Assets, SEC: INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/specialized-resources/spotlightinitial-coin-offerings-digital-assets.
79
As explained in Stuart R. Cohn, The Impact of Securities Laws on Developing
Companies: Would the Wright Brothers Have Gotten Off the Ground?, 3 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 315 (1999):
A Ponzi scheme is one that involves using new investor money to pay
older investors a promised interest or other economic return. Investors
are not aware of this circular use of invested funds and are falsely led to
believe that the economic return is being generated by company
operations, which are usually minimal or nonexistent. The term “Ponzi
scheme” is derived from the notorious activities of Charles Ponzi in
Boston, beginning in December 1919. Ponzi offered investors a 50%
return on short-term notes, claiming that his company would earn huge
amounts through the international trading of postal coupons. Interest
payments were made on a timely basis, causing others to believe in the
merits of the company. In fact, no business operations were ever
undertaken. Ponzi collected over $14 million within eight months and
made payments of approximately $9 million to his investors. The scheme
was finally exposed in August 1920 by a Boston newspaper. Ponzi was
sentenced to prison, from which he was paroled after three years.
Following a second conviction several years later for a real estate fraud,
he was deported to Italy and was employed by Mussolini in the Ministry
of Finance. See In re Ponzi, 268 F. 997 (D.Mass.1920).
The “slight” difference between a Ponzi scheme and a pyramid scheme was
explained as follows by the First Circuit:
While the terms Ponzi and “pyramid” often are used interchangeably to
describe financial arrangements which rob Peter to pay Paul, the two
differ slightly. In Ponzi schemes—named after a notorious Boston
swindler, Charles Ponzi, who parlayed an initial stake of $150 into a
fortune by means of an elaborate scheme featuring promissory notes
yielding interest at annual rates of up to 50%—money tendered by later
investors is used to pay off earlier investors. In contrast, pyramid
schemes incorporate a recruiting element; they are marketing
arrangements in which participants are rewarded financially based upon
their ability to induce others to participate.
SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 50 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001).
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moment money stops flowing in from others, the Ponzi scheme
collapses. Ponzi schemes clearly fall within the definition of
securities.80 The same is true with respect to pyramid schemes which
also fall within the definition of security.81
ICOs should be treated as public offerings of securities. As noted
above, the courts and the SEC agree that ICOs generally are subject
to the securities laws.82 Among other things, this means that an ICO
would be subject to the registration and prospectus delivery
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.83
The foregoing discussion analyzes crypto currencies and ICOs
under the two tests used by the courts for determining whether a
security exists. ICOs satisfy both the Howey test and the more
expansive risk capital analysis. Depending on the surrounding
circumstances, secondary market transactions in crypto currencies
are also likely to be subject to the securities laws.
80

SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 290 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing how a
Ponzi scheme violated securities antifraud provisions); SEC v. Infinity Grp. Co.,
27 F. Supp. 2d 559 (E.D. Pa. 1998), affd, 212 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding
subject matter jurisdiction over Ponzi scheme); SEC v. Bennett, 889 F. Supp. 804
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (stating a Ponzi scheme was a security); see also, e.g., SEC v.
George, 426 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing how a Ponzi scheme violated
securities law antifraud provisions and prohibitions against unregistered
offerings).
81
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); see, e.g.,
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
82
See e.g., SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, 2019 WL 625163 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (finding
that ICO involved securities and issuing a preliminary injunction); United States
v. Zaslavskiy, 2018 WL 4346336 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (upholding indictment
alleging a fraud in connection with an ICO); SEC v. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182
(E.D. Tex. 2013) (ICO was an offering of securities); Complaint at 2, Blockvest,
No. 18CV228718, 2019 WL 625163 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2018/comp24314.pdf; SEC Stops
Fraudulent ICO that Falsely Claimed SEC Approval, Exchange Act Release No.
245314, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2018/lr24314.htm (Oct. 11,
2018); DAO Report, supra note 62 (discussing digital currencies and the
securities laws); see also, e.g., In the Matter of Gladius Network LLC, Securities
Act Release No. 33-1068 (Feb. 20, 2019) (cease and desist order); Jennifer
Bennett & Andrew Ramonas, Crypto Firm Gladius Self-Reports ICO, Avoids
Fine, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 20, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securitieslaw/crypto-firm-gladius-self-reports-ico-avoids-sec-fine-1.
83
1933 Act §§ 5–10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e–77j (2018).
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In contrast to digital coins that are traded for investments, coins
that are strictly limited to use as a currency substitute may avoid
securities law consequences. An SEC official has indicated that
“[c]losed, fully-functional business ‘ecosystems’ that issue digital
tokens through an initial coin offering may be able to avoid having
to register their offerings as securities . . . .”84 For example, banking
giant JPMorgan is implementing a digital coin to facilitate corporate
payments by relying on blockchain rather than slower decentralized
public legers.85 True utility tokens having no secondary investment
market would likely not qualify as securities.86 This makes sense to
the extent that such purely use-oriented tokens do not have an
investment component and are purely operating as a currency
substitute.
See Lydia Beyoud, ‘Chuck E. Cheese’ Test May Tell SEC if Crypto Token a
Security, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bank
ing-law/chuck-e-cheese-test-may-tell-sec-if-crypto-token-a-security (quoting
Jonathan Ingram, Deputy Chief Counsel of the Div. of Corp. Fin.).
85
See Michelle F. Davis & Alastair Marsh, JPMorgan to Use Digital Coin to
Speed Up Corporate Payments, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X58JLE3K000000?.
86
See, e.g., TurnKey Jet, Ink, SEC No Action Letter, 2019 WL 1554004 (Apr.
3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet040219-2a1.htm (providing that the SEC staff would not treat ICO of utility
tokens as securities where 1) the issuer would not use the funds from token sales
for operations or product development, 2) the token will have immediate
functionality for purchasing the issuer’s services, 3) transfer of the tickets will be
restricted to wallets authorized by the issuer, 4) each token throughout its
existence will be limited to $1 value in exchange for the issuer’s services, 5) any
offer by the issuer to repurchase the tokens would be at a discount from face value
(unless pursuant to a court ordered liquidation), and 5) the token will be marketed
in a way that emphasizes the token’s functionality rather than the potential for an
increase in the token’s market value); Troy A. Paredes & Scott Kimpel, From
Orange Groves to Cryptocurrency: How Will the SEC Apply Longstanding Tests
to New Technologies, 20 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 56, 60–61 (2019) (discussing
utility tokes and the definition of security); Nate Crosser, Comment, Initial Coin
Offerings as Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain Utility Tokens Securities?, 67
U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 421–22 (2018) (suggesting that sale of true utility tokens
should be viewed as sale of commodities); Max Dilendorf, Rika Khurdayan &
Gleb Zaslavsky, INSIGHT: The Dual Nature of ‘Utility’ Tokens and Dual Token
Structures, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
corporate-law/insight-the-dual-nature-of-utility-tokens-and-dual-tokenstructures.
84
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V. CONSEQUENCES OF CLASSIFYING A CRYPTO CURRENCY AS A
SECURITY
A. 1933 Act Registration Requirements
As noted above, as an initial offering of securities, ICOs would
have to be registered with the SEC under the 1933 Act. 1933 Act
registration involves detailed disclosures about the investment being
offered.87 One of the most significant disclosures for ICOs would be
the description of investors’ risk factors.88 The detailed 1933 Act
disclosures are also embodied in statutorily required prospectus
disclosures that must be delivered to the investors during the
offering process before the securities may be purchased.89
Preparation of a registration statement is a long and expensive
process, requiring detailed disclosures including those relating to
investment risks.90 These disclosures would provide much more
detail than investors would be likely to find in a white paper91 for an
unregistered ICO. Thus, for example, full disclosure would assure
that the description in the white paper and prospectus would match
the actual code and the coins’ or tokens’ intended use. As noted
directly above, the disclosures would also include a detailed
description of the risk factors in the offering and coins or tokens

87

S.E.C. Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2018) (form for 1933 Act registration);
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2018) (detailing the scope of the disclosure
requirements).
88
Regulation S-K item 503, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2018) (covering a prospectus
summary, including risk factors); see also id., item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303
(2018) (covering management discussion and analysis, which elaborates on the
types of risks and uncertainties that must be disclosed and discussed).
89
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10) (providing the definition of prospectus); id.
§ 5(b) (providing prospectus delivery requirements); id. § 10 (providing statutory
prospectus requirements); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(10), 77e(b), 77j (2018).
90
See 1 HAZEN, supra note 1, § 3:6 (discussing the preparation of the
registration statement).
91
A white paper is the narrative that describes the coins or tokens being offered.
See, e.g., What is a White Paper and How to Write it, COINTELEGRAPH,
https://cointelegraph.com/ico-101/what-is-a-white-paper-and-how-to-write-it
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019); WHITEPAPER DATABASE (last visited Feb. 22, 2019)
(supplying a database of crypto currency white papers).
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being offered.92 Material misstatements in the registration statement
can result in liability, which is strict liability for the issuer of the
securities and negligence for other participants in the registration
statement.93
The registration process is divided into three periods. Prior to the
filing of the registration statement with the SEC (the prefiling
period), there are strict limitations on what can be said about the
upcoming public offering.94 Once the registration statement is filed,
there is a statutory twenty-day waiting period,95 which generally is
considerably longer for an initial offering.96 Although statutorilyqualified offers may be made during the waiting period,97 sales
cannot be made until after the registration statement has become
effective.98 The SEC has been vigorously pursuing unregistered
ICOs.99 In addition to SEC enforcement, unregistered ICOs can
result in private rights of actions by purchasers of the crypto
currencies that should have been registered or that otherwise failed
to comply with the 1933 Act’s registration requirements.100
To summarize, absent an exemption from registration with the
SEC,101 (1) offers to sell may not be made prior to filing the
92

See SEC Regulation S-K, item 503, 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2018) (prospectus
summary and risk factors).
93
1933 Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018).
94
1933 Act § 5(c) prohibits offers to sell prior to the filing of the registration
statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2018). “Offer to sell” is broadly defined to include
any communication reasonably calculated to generate a buying interest. See
§ 77b(a)(3) (providing the definition of “offer to sell”); Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades &
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5870, 38 S.E.C. 843, 844 (1959); SEC Rule 135,
17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2018).
95
1933 Act § 21 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (2018).
96
See 1 HAZEN, supra note 1, §§ 2:15, 2:29 (discussing the waiting period).
97
1933 Act § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2018).
98
1933 Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2018).
99
See Two ICO Issuers Settle SEC Registration Charges, Agree to Register
Tokens as Securities, SEC 18-264, 2018 WL 6011701 (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-264 (SEC); SEC Public Statement,
supra note 30.
100
Section 12(a)(1) provides a right of rescission to purchasers of securities that
were sold in violation of 1933 Act § 5. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1) (2018).
101
Exemptions are found in 1933 Act §§ 3, 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (2018).
These exemptions are strictly construed and the burden of establishing an
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registration statement,102 (2) after filing, offers must comply with the
statutory prospectus delivery requirements,103 and (3) sales cannot
be made until the registration becomes effective after the expiration
of the statutory waiting period.104
B. State Regulation
In addition to SEC consequences, ICOs may implicate state
securities laws (also known as blue sky laws).105 State securities law
registration requirements would apply to ICOs unless registered
with the SEC under the 1933 Act.106 State securities administrators
have been quite active with respect to crypto currency
transactions.107 For example, the North American Securities
Administrators Association (“NASAA”) has flagged ICOs and
crypto currency transactions in general as involving a high potential
for securities fraud.108 NASAA also created a taskforce of state
securities administrators to engage in “Operation Cryptosweep” that
resulted in more than 200 inquiries or investigations and nearly 50
enforcement actions in more than 40 states.109
exemption falls on the person claiming the exemption. See generally 1 HAZEN,
supra note 1, ch. 4 (discussing 1933 Act exemptions).
102
1933 Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2018).
103
1933 Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2018).
104
1933 Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2018).
105
See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 78A-24–31.
106
See, e.g., In the Matter of Symatri, LLC, Order No. ENF-18-CDO-1765,
(Tex. Securities Bd. June 11, 2018) (providing a cease and desist order against an
ICO); see also, e.g., Karn Dhingra, Texas Crypto Fraud Enforcement Efforts go
International, BLOOMBERG BNA: SEC. L. DAILY (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XCCLEODO000000?jcsearch=bna
%252000000166ef2ada49a966ffef5c2f0002#jcite.
107
See, e.g., Lydia Beyoud & Andrew Ramonas, Meet the State Enforcers on
the Frontline of Crypto Fraud Fight, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.bna.com/meet-state-enforcers-n57982090106/.
108
NASAA Reminds Investors to Approach Cryptocurrencies, Initial Coin
Offerings and Other CryptoCurrency-Related Investment Productions with
Caution,
N.
AM.
SEC.
ADMIN.
ASSOC.
(Jan.
4,
2018),
http://www.nasaa.org/44073/nasaa-reminds-investors-approach-cryptocurrencies
-initial-coin-offerings-cryptocurrency-related-investment-products-caution/.
109
See Operation Cryptosweep, N. AM. SEC. ADMIN. ASSOC.,
http://www.nasaa.org/regulatory-activity/enforcement-legal-activity/operationcryptosweep/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2018) (listing investigations and enforcement
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Even where the state registration requirements are preempted by
federal law, the state antifraud provisions would nevertheless apply
to ICO transactions.110 There can be state law consequences beyond
those imposed by securities laws.111 For example, Colorado recently
issued an exemption from its money transmitter licensing rules for
virtual currency exchanges that do not handle transactions between
virtual and real currencies, but licensing would be required for
exchanges allowing real currency transactions.112 New York has
established a mechanism for the licensing of digital currency
firms.113
C. Exemptions from 1933 Act Registration
Aside from recognizing ICOs as public offerings of securities,
there are other 1933 Act issues. For example, what about secondary
transactions apart from or in the aftermarket following an ICO?114
The 1933 Act’s registration requirements apply absent an
exemption. Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act provide exemptions

actions); see also, e.g., Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, N.D. SEC.
DEP’T, http://www.nd.gov/securities/enforcement-investment-fraud/cryptoinvestments-bulletin (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
110
The state registration requirements are preempted for federally registered
offerings. 1933 Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2018).
111
See, e.g., Lydia Beyoud, N.Y. Attorney General Refers Three Crypto
Exchanges for Probe, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://news.bloombergl
aw.com/banking-law/ny-attorney-general-refers-three-crypto-exchanges-forprobe; see also Lydia Beyoud, House Lawmakers Plan Bill to Preempt State
Crypto
Regulation,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Sept.
25,
2018),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/house-lawmakers-plan-bill-topreempt-state-crypto-regulation.
112
COLO. DEP’T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, INTERIM REGULATORY
GUIDANCE CRYPTOCURRENCY AND THE COLORADO MONEY TRANSMITTERS ACT
(Sept. 20, 2018), http://src.bna.com/B1v.
113
See Evan Weinberger, N.Y. OKs Virtual Currency Firms to Use Nationwide
Licensing Tool, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
banking-law/ny-oks-virtual-currency-firms-to-use-nationwide-licensing-tool.
114
See, e.g., Alfredo B. D. Silva & F. Dario de Martino, Structuring Secondary
Token Sales: How to Monetize Digital Tokens Under U.S. Securities Laws,
BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-structuringsecondary-n73014482631/ (discussing the difference between ICOs and aftermarket transactions).
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that could be applicable to certain crypto currency transactions. 115
Section 4(a)(1) of the 1933 Act exempts most secondary securities
transactions.116 As such, even though treated as securities,
transactions in crypto currencies between buyers and sellers would
not be subject to 1933 Act registration even though they would be
subject to the securities laws’ anti-fraud117 and anti-manipulation118
provisions.
At least in theory, there are some other exemptions from 1933
Act registration that could be used to avoid a full-fledged 1933 Act
registration for an ICO. The exemptions for public offerings, which
are described below, include offerings exempt under SEC
Regulation A,119 qualifying crowdfunding offerings,120 and intrastate
offerings.121 In addition, offerings made only to qualified investors
can qualify for the exemption for offerings not involving a public
offering.122 All of these, except potentially the non-public offering
exemption, are not suitable for ICOs.
Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act exempts transactions not
involving a public offering.123 As interpreted by the Supreme Court,
115

17 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77e (2018).
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2018), which exempts transactions not involving
an issuer, underwriter or dealer. See generally 1 HAZEN, supra note 1, §§ 4:93–
4:102 (discussing the non-public offering exemption).
117
See, e.g., 1933 Act § 17(a); 1934 Act § 10(b); SEC Rule 10b-5; 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77q, 78j(b) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 1934 Act Rule 10b-5
prohibits material misstatements and omissions of fact in connection with a
purchase or sale of securities and also supports an implied private right of action.
See 3 HAZEN, supra note 1, § 12:15. Scienter, or the intent to deceive, is an
element of any Rule 10b-5 violation. See id. §§ 12:50-12:58. Section 17(a) of the
1933 Act prohibits material misstatements and omissions in connection with the
offer or sale of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2018). Section 17(a) thus applies
to fraud by sellers of securities but not by purchasers. Although section 17(a) does
not support an implied private right of action, scienter is not required and can be
violated by negligent conduct. See HAZEN, supra note 1, §§ 12:50, 12:97.
118
See, e.g., 1934 Act §§ 9, 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j(b) (2018).
119
SEC Rules 251–63, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–263 (2018).
120
1933 Act § 4(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2018).
121
1933 Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2018); SEC Rules 147, 147A,
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147, 230.147A (2018).
122
1933 Act § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2018).
123
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2018).
116
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a non-public offering involves an offering to sophisticated investors
who are able to fend for themselves.124 Accordingly an ICO offered
and sold only to qualifying investors would be exempt from the
1933 Act registration requirements applicable to public offerings.
This would include an offering solely to “accredited investors”125—
a concept that includes high wealth individuals.126 Therefore, private
placements of ICO’s remain a viable option.127 However, if a public
market develops in the wake of a private placement, the 1933 Act
registration requirements likely would be implicated.128 In addition,
1933 Act section 4(a)(5)129 and SEC Rule 504130 provide simpler
exemptions for nonpublic offerings up to $5 million, provided the
offering is made solely to accredited investors. The Rule 504 and
section 4(a)(5) limited offering exemptions are simpler than the nonpublic offering exemption under section 4(a)(2) or Rule 506131
because those latter exemptions are likely to have additional
limitations on the qualification of investors necessary for an exempt
transaction.132 On the other hand, the non-public offering exemption

124
See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt.
Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977).
125
Accredited investor includes individuals with a net worth of at least $1
million or an annual income of $200,000 (or joint annual income of $300,000).
See SEC Rule 501(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (2018).
126
SEC Rule 506 exempts offerings solely to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506 (2018). 1933 Act § 4(a)(5) exempts offerings up to $5 million solely to
accredited investors. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5) (2018). In contrast, there is no dollar
ceiling for a non-public offering under section 4(a)(2).
127
See, e.g., Olga Kharif, ICOs Alive and Well as Crypto Startups Go After
Wealthy Buyers, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-02-13/icos-alive-and-well-as-crypto-startups-go-afterwealthy-buyers.
128
See generally HAZEN, supra note 1, § 4:88 (providing an overview of the
non-public offering exemption).
129
15 U.S.C. § 77d(A)(5) (2018).
130
17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2018).
131
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2018).
132
For example, the exemption for transactions not involving a public company
require a showing of access to information and the investors’ ability to fend for
themselves. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (setting
forth the requirements for the § 4(a)(2) exemption). See generally HAZEN, supra
note 1, §§ 4:64–4:88.
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under Rule 506 results in automatic preemption of any state
securities law registration requirements.133
Another exemption from 1934 Act registration is found in SEC
Regulation A134 for offerings up to $50 million.135 Regulation A
offerings operate much like a registered offering in that there is a
required disclosure document and a waiting period after the
disclosures are filed with the SEC until the effective date when sales
may be made. Thus, any attempt to use Regulation A for an ICO
would involve disclosures that are absent from other unregistered
ICOs.
A third at least theoretical, exemption would be the use of
crowdsourcing for ICOs. Section 4(a)(5) of the 1933 Act provides
an exemption from registration for offerings up to $1 million.136 The
low dollar ceiling may render the crowdfunding exemption
undesirable for ICOs. Although significantly less detailed than
Regulation A or registered offerings, the crowdfunding exemption
is conditioned on minimal disclosures.137 Another requirement for
any crowdfunding offering is that the website or portal for the
offering must be registered with the SEC.138
A final exemption worth mentioning is the intrastate offering
exemption.139 The statutory exemption for offers made solely within
the borders of a single state requires that the issue be organized in
and the business be substantially confined to that state.140 One
practical difficulty is how to conduct an intrastate offering over the
internet which by its very nature crosses state lines. The intrastate
exemption provided in SEC Rule 147A not only avoids the
133

15 U.S.C. § 77b(4)(F) (2018).
17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2018).
135
17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2018). Regulation A offers two tiers—offerings up
to $20 million (tier 1) and offerings up to $50 million (tier 2). The primary
difference between the two tiers is the level and detail of required disclosures.
136
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2018). The dollar ceiling was raised to $1,070,000
by SEC Crowdfunding Rule 100(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1) (2018).
137
17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201–.202 (2018).
138
The registration requirement for crowdfunding portals is set forth in 1933
Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d-1 (2018).
139
1933 Act § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2018); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147,
147A (2018).
140
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2018).
134
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requirement that the issuer of the securities be organized in the state
of the offering, but it also allows offers beyond the state’s borders
so long as out of state investors are excluded from the offering.141 If
an intrastate ICO is economically viable, there could thus be an
exemption from 1933 Act registration. However, the laws of most
states would require that such an offering be registered under the
applicable state blue sky law.
The discussion above shows that the theoretically available
exemptions for 1933 Act registration would likely not be feasible
for an ICO. Furthermore, even if such an exemption could be used,
it would only be an exemption from 1933 Act registration and would
not impact the other consequences of an investment being classified
as a security. Those consequences are discussed in the section that
follows.
D. Other Consequences of Classifying Crypto Currency as a
Security
Classifying a crypto currency as a security has a number of
consequences beyond the 1933 Act’s registration requirements. The
SEC has brought enforcement actions based on ICOs as unregistered
securities offerings.142 The securities laws’ anti-fraud143 and antimanipulation144 provisions would apply to all crypto transactions.
Virtual and crypto currencies are particularly ripe for manipulation.
For example, virtual and crypto currencies have been susceptible to
classic “pump and dump” manipulation.145 The SEC has noted this
141

17 C.F.R. § 230.147A (2018).
E.g., Crypto Asset Mgmt., Securities Act Release 10544, Investment
Company Act Release No. 33222, 2018 WL 4329663 (Sept. 11, 2018) (providing
a cease and desist Order after finding an ICO violated the 1933 Act’s registration
provisions); SEC v. Sharma, No. 1:18-cv-02909, 2018 WL 1603904 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2018/comp-pr201853.pdf (charging violations of 1933 Act registration requirements); SEC v.
PlexCorps, No. 17-CIV-7007, 2017 WL 6398722 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017)
(charging fraud and registration violations in connection with ICOs).
143
E.g., 1933 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2018); 1934 Act § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
144
E.g., 1934 Act §§ 9–10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (2018).
145
See Shane Shifflett & Paul Vigna, Traders are Talking up Cryptocurrencies,
Then Dumping Them, Costing Others Millions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2018),
142
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potential for securities manipulation in its denial of approval for
exchange traded funds (“ETFs”) based on crypto currencies.146
Following the SEC’s continued delay in addressing the Chicago
Board Options Exchange’s (“Cboe”) application for a crypto
currency ETF, the exchange withdrew its listing application. 147
However, following the end of the government shutdown, Cboe
reapplied for listing of a bitcoin exchange traded fund.148
The SEC also has brought enforcement actions charging
manipulation and fraud in connection with crypto currency
https://www.wsj.com/graphics/cryptocurrency-schemes-generate-bigcoin/ (discussing crypto currency pump and dump schemes). In a classic pump
and dump scheme, the perpetrator pumps up the market with hype and purchases
of the target investment and then dumps the investment at a profit. See United
States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding conviction for pump and
dump scheme but remanding for resentencing); United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d
197 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding fraud conviction in classic pump and dump
scheme); Jerome E. Rosen, Litigation Release No. 44105, 2001 WL 333197 (Mar.
27, 2001) (providing that the SEC initiated the proceedings based on allegations
that the initiation of defendant engaged in classic pump and dump scheme by
touting stock without disclosing that it received 60,000 shares to do so). See
generally HAZEN, supra note 1, §§ 14:137, 14:150 (discussing registered brokerdealer obligations).
146
See, e.g., Marion A. Brown, Comment, Cryptocurrency and Financial
Regulation: The SEC’s Rejection of Bitcoin-Based ETPs, 23 N.C. BANK. INST.
139 (2019) (discussing denial of ETF listing); David Scheer, SEC Quashes More
Bitcoin ETF Pitches in Another Blow to Crypto, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 22, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-23/sec-quashes-morebitcoin-etf-pitches-in-another-blow-to-crypto (same). SEC Commissioner Peirce
dissented from the denial and has voiced her objection elsewhere. See Hester M
Peirce, Motherhood and Humble Pie: Remarks before the Cato Institute’s FinTech
Unbound Conference, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-091218
(Sept. 12, 2018); see also, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe BZX
Exchange, Inc.; Order Instituting Proceedings to Determine Whether to Approve
or Disapprove a Proposed Rule Change to List and Trade Shares of SolidX Bitcoin
Shares Issued by the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin Trust Under BZX Rule 14.11(e)(4),
Commodity-Based Trust Shares, Exchange Act Release No. 84231, 2018 WL
4584243 (Sept. 20, 2018) (seeking public comments on ETF listing application).
147
See Ben Bain, CBOE Bitcoin ETF Application Pulled After Repeated SEC
Delays, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
securities-law/cboe-bitcoin-etf-application-pulled-after-repeated-sec-delays-1.
148
See Nick Baker, Cboe Reapplies to List the First Bitcoin ETF After SEC
Reopens, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/X34OELUS000000?udv_expired=true.
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transactions.149 The potential for manipulation, as well as the
uncertainty over the risks associated with crypto currencies, were
also prominent in the SEC’s suspension of trading in virtual
currency tracking certificates.150 The CFTC has also voiced concerns
over crypto currency manipulation. For example, the CFTC secured
a federal court order against a crypto currency boiler room
operation.151 In addition to SEC enforcement efforts and CFTC
initiatives, the Department of Justice launched criminal
investigations into suspected crypto currency price manipulation.152
The Department of Justice has also secured indictments based on
securities fraud involving digital currency.153
Anyone in the business of selling or promoting crypto currency
transactions could be classified as a broker-dealer and thus subject
to the 1934 Act’s broker-dealer registration requirements.154 The
149

E.g., SEC Obtains Emergency Order Halting Fraudulent Coin Offering
Scheme, S.E.C. 18-94, 2018 WL 2411301 (May 29, 2018); see also, e.g., Camilo
Russo & Benjamin Robertson, Crypto’s Open Secret: Multibillion-Dollar Volume
is Suspect, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti
cles/2018-09-27/crypto-s-open-secret-its-multibillion-dollar-volume-is-suspect
(discussing crypto manipulation and pending criminal investigation).
150
In the Matter of Certain Bitcoin/Ether Tracking Certificates, File No. 500-1,
SEC (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2018/34-84063o.pdf (order of suspension of trading); see also Statement on Order of Suspension
of
Trading
of
Certain
Bitcoin/Ether
Tracking
Certificates,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/suspension-trading-certain-bitcoinether-tracking-certificates.
151
CFTC v. McDonnell, No. 18-CV-361 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/201808/enfdropmarketsmemorandum082318.pdf (memorandum order imposing
sanctions); CFTC v. McDonnell, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (upholding
CFTC jurisdiction to pursue crypto currency); CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp.
3d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that virtual currency was subject to CFTC
jurisdiction and issuing a preliminary injunction).
152
See, e.g., Matt Robinson & Tom Schoenberg, Bitcoin Rigging Criminal
Probe Said to Home in on Tether, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://news.
bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/bitcoin-rigging-criminal-probe-said-to-homein-on-tether-1-1 (describing the criminal investigation).
153
See Dep’t of Just. News Release, Cryptocurrency CEO Indicted After
Defrauding Investors of $4 Million, 2018 WL 6243047 (Nov. 28, 2018).
154
Among other things, broker-dealers in securities, absent an exemption, must
register with the SEC and with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA). Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o
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SEC has in fact brought enforcement actions for crypto currency
sales by an unregistered broker-dealer.155 The Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) also requires registration of
broker-dealers.156 Thus, for example, FINRA has pursued registered
broker-dealers and associated persons157 FINRA announced an
enforcement priority for supervising and monitoring digital
currency transactions by FINRA member broker-dealers and
associated persons.158
To the extent that secondary or after-market transactions in
crypto currencies involve securities, any web portal or exchange for
(2018). See, e.g., Benjamin Bain, Brokers’ Cryptocurrency Deals Are Focus of
SEC Review, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2018-08-02/brokers-cryptocurrency-deals-are-said-to-be-focus-ofsec-review. See generally HAZEN, supra note 1, ch. 14 (discussing broker-dealer
regulation).
155
Tokenlot, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 33-10543, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 34-84075, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-33221
(Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10543.pdf (cease
and desist order against crypto currency transactions by unregistered brokerdealer).
156
See 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (2018) (providing the statutory authority for
registered securities associations). See generally 4 Hazen, supra note 1 §§ 14:7,
14:24 (discussing self-regulation, FINRA’s role, and market regulation).
157
As defined by the 1934 Act:
The term “person associated with a broker or dealer” or “associated
person of a broker or dealer” means any partner, officer, director, or
branch manager of such broker or dealer (or any person occupying a
similar status or performing similar functions), any person directly or
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such
broker or dealer, or any employee of such broker or dealer, except that
any person associated with a broker or dealer whose functions are solely
clerical or ministerial shall not be included in the meaning of such term
....
15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(18) (2018).
158
See 2019 Annual Risk Monitoring and Examination Priorities Letter,
FINRA (Jan. 22, 2019), http://www.finra.org/industry/2019-annual-riskmonitoring-and-examination-priorities-letter; 2018 Regulatory and Examination
Priorities Letter, FINRA (Jan. 8, 2018), http://www.finra.org/industry/2018regulatory-and-examination-priorities-letter; Andrew Ramonas, Brokerage
Regulator to Step Up Scrutiny of Crypto Assets in 2019,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securitieslaw/brokerage-regulator-to-step-up-scrutiny-of-crypto-assets-in-2019.
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those transactions would have to be registered as a securities
exchange under the 1934 Act.159 Earlier this year, the death of a
Canadian exchange’s CEO resulted in a potential loss of hundreds
of millions of dollars since no one else had the encryption key to
unlock the exchange’s crypto currency wallets. 160 It is conceivable
that regulation as an exchange might have prevented this scenario.
Other potential problems with exchanges include the potential of
manipulation161 which could be curtailed with exchange regulation.
State securities administrators have also pursued online
platforms for crypto currencies.162 There has been some preliminary
movement in Congress to preempt the states with respect to crypto
currency regulation163 but there is no indication that anything is
likely to happen soon.
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 requires registration of
professionals charging for securities related investment advice.164
159

1934 Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2018); see, e.g., Zachary Coburn, Exchange
Act Release No. 84,553 (Nov. 8, 2018) (cease and desist settlement order); DIV.
OF ENF’T, DIV. OF TRADING & DIV. OF MKTS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC
Public Statement on Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital
Assets (Div. of Trading & Markets Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
news/public-statement/enforcement-tm-statement-potentially-unlawful-onlineplatforms-trading; see also, e.g., Dennis Chu, Note, Broker-Dealers for Virtual
Currency: Regulating Cryptocurrency Wallets and Exchanges, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 2323 (2018) (suggesting the regulation of broker-dealers as potential
guidance for the regulation of cryptocurrency platforms).
160
See Doug Alexander, Crypto CEO Dies Holding Only Passwords That Can
Unlock Millions in Customer Coins, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-04/crypto-exchangefounder-dies-leaves-behind-200-million-problem; see also, e.g., Doug
Alexander, Quadriga Fuels Race Among Lawyers for Slice of Lost Millions,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201902-12/quadriga-sparks-race-among-lawyers-for-slice-of-lost-millions.
161
See supra text accompanying notes 144–146.
162
See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Launches
Inquiry Into Crypto Currency “Exchanges” (Apr. 17, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/
press-release/ag-schneiderman-launches-inquiry-cryptocurrency-exchanges.
163
See Lydia Beyoud, Colorado Exempts Some Crypto Exchanges from
Licensing Rules, BLOOMBERG BNA: SEC. L. DAILY (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X29IVKPO000000?jcsearch=bna%2
5200000016608f7d667a56f0bff4e020000#jcite.
164
Investment Advisers Act § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2018).
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Accordingly, giving advice regarding crypto currencies can thus
trigger those registration requirements.165
In addition to federal law consequences, the states regulate
securities broker-dealers. Thus, enforcement actions may be brought
by state regulators against broker-dealers who violate the state
securities laws broker-dealer registration provisions.166 A number of
state securities regulators have been active in pursuing crypto
currency transactions.167
VI. CONCLUSION
Crypto currency markets have been exceptionally volatile. Many
investors have suffered massive losses. The need for regulating
these high-risk markets should be evident from its performance over
the years. Although there are only a handful of decisions to date, the
SEC and the courts agree that initial coin offerings involve an
offering of securities and thus are subject to SEC regulation. These
decisions are headed in the right direction. By applying the Supreme
Court’s test of what type of investment qualifies as a security, many
if not all crypto currency transactions warrant scrutiny under the
securities laws. Even beyond ICOs, crypto currency transactions
often will implicate the securities laws. For example, the antifraud
provisions as well as the broker-dealer and exchange registration
requirements for those in the business of marketing crypto
currencies should be applied to many crypto currency transactions.
In the unlikely event that federal regulation can be avoided, state
securities laws have used a broader test for classifying investments
as securities. Accordingly, state laws may reach transactions not
pursued by the SEC. It follows that with the exception of true utility
165

Crypto Asset Mgmt., LP, Securities Act Release No. 10,544, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 5,004, Investment Company Act Release No. 33,222,
Administrative Proceeding No. 3-18740 (Sept. 11, 2018) (SEC Cease and Desist
Order) (noting the ICO violated Investment Advisers Act registration provisions).
166
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-39 (2017) (providing that enforcement
actions can include “[d]enial, revocation, suspension, censure, cancellation and
withdrawal of [broker-dealer] registration”).
167
See, e.g., Cryptocurrencies and Investing, N.C. SECRETARY OF
STATE, https://www.sosnc.gov/divisions/securities/cryptocurrencies_and_investi
ng (last visited Nov. 6, 2018).
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tokens with no investment market, many, if not most crypto
currencies are likely to implicate the securities laws at least at some
point during their life cycle.

